Dynamic Software Model Checking

Patrice Godefroid

Microsoft Research

Ed Clarke: A man, An idea...

• LASER'2011 summer school (Elba island, Italy)



Ed Clarke: A man, An idea...

- LASER'2011 summer school (Elba island, Italy)
- Q from student: "career advice for young researcher?"
- Ed: "Pick an idea that excites you, then devote your life to it."



Insight: Model Checking is Super Testing

- Simple yet effective technique for finding bugs
- In the software-engineering universe:



coverage (bugs)

Dynamic Software Model Checking

- How to apply model checking to analyze software?
 - "Real" programming languages (e.g., C, C++, Java),
 - "Real" size (e.g., 100,000's lines of code).
- Two main approaches to software model checking:



Example: SAGE @ Microsoft

- Problem: How to systematically explore efficiently the state spaces of sequential programs to find bugs due to malformed inputs?
- Motivation: security testing at Microsoft
- Software security bugs can be very expensive:
 - Cost of each Microsoft Security Bulletin: \$Millions
 - Cost due to worms (Slammer, CodeRed, Blaster, etc.): \$Billions
- Many security exploits are initiated via files or packets
 - Ex: MS Windows includes parsers for hundreds of file formats
- Security testing: "hunting for million-dollar bugs"



A Solution: Whitebox Fuzzing [NDSS'08]

- Idea: mix fuzz testing with dynamic test generation
 - Dynamic symbolic execution to collect constraints on inputs
 - Negate those, solve new constraints to get new tests
 - Repeat → "systematic dynamic test generation" (= DART)
 (Why dynamic ? Because most precise ! [PLDI'05, PLDI'11])
- Combine with a generational search (not DFS)
 - Negate 1-by-1 each constraint in a path constraint
 - Generate many children for each parent run
 - Challenge all the layers of the application sooner
 - Leverage expensive symbolic execution
- Implemented in the tool SAGE
 - Optimized for large x86 trace analysis, file fuzzing

parent

The Search Space



SAGE Results

Since 2007: many new security bugs found (missed by blackbox fuzzers, static analysis)

- Apps: image decoders, media players, document processors,...
- Bugs: Write A/Vs, Read A/Vs, Crashes,...
- Many triaged as "security critical, severity 1, priority 1" (would trigger Microsoft security bulletin if known outside MS)
- Example: WEX Security team for Win7
 - Dedicated fuzzing lab with 100s machines
 - 100s apps (deployed on 1 billion+ computers)
 - ~1/3 of all fuzzing bugs found by SAGE !



How fuzzing bugs found (2006-2009) :



Impact of SAGE (in Numbers)

- 500+ machine-years
 - Runs in the largest dedicated fuzzing lab in the world
 - Largest computational usage ever for any SMT solver
- 100s of apps, 100s of bugs (missed by everything else)
 - Bug fixes shipped quietly (no MSRCs) to 1 Billion+ PCs
 - Millions of dollars saved (for Microsoft and the world)
- "Practical Verification":
 - Eradicate all buffer overflows in all Windows parsers
 - <5 security bulletins in all SAGE-cleaned Win7 parsers, 0 since 2011
 - If nobody can find bugs in P, P is observationally equiv to "verified"!
 - Reduce costs & risks for Microsoft, increase those for Black Hats
 2000
 2015
 2010
 2015

Conclusion: Ed Clarke

- A man
- An idea
- A community
- Changing the world



(Elba, 2011)

Thank you !

There is one thing stronger than all the armies in the world; and that is an idea whose time has come. -- Victor Hugo